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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
:
-vsLEO JAMES SUIT and WILLARD
CLARK HASTINGS,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
13833

:
:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary
rendered in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District,
in and for Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable
J. Harlan Burns, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
Appellants were charged with the crime of burglary
and were bound over for trial in the district court.

A jury

found them guilty and sentenced appellants to an indeterminate
term as prescribed by law.

It is from that conviction that

this appeal arises.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks that the verdict of the lower court
be sustained.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the 8th day of March, 1974, a complaint was filed
against

Clark Hastings and Leo James Suit, charging them with

committing the crime of burglary, a third degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953), as amended.
A preliminary hearing was held on April 18, 1974, and appellants
were bound over for trial in the district court.

An informa-

tion was properly filed and the case went to trial on May 22,
1974, before the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, sitting with a jury.
Upon the following facts, the jury returned a verdict of guilty:
On January 17, 1974, at approximately 1:00 o'clock
a.m., Clark Hastings, Leo James Suit and Daniel Wilbur broke
into a local hardwood and furniture store and removed several
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items of inventory.

Entry was accomplished by breaking out

the glass window in the back door of the building.

Appellants

carried the stolen articles from the premises, placed them in
their vehicle and fled the scene.

All of the actions of

appellants were part of a pre-conceived scheme to "hit" the
store.

The stolen properly was then transported to Las Vegas,,

Nevada, where it was subsequently discovered pursuant to a valid
search warrant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT WAS PROPERLY
INVOKED AS TO THE THIRD DEGREE FELONY BURGLARY CHARGE.
Appellants contend the District Court proceeded without
jurisdiction in the instant case.

They claim that the complaint

and the information charging them with the crime of burglary
were fatally defective in that they failed to allege "intent,"
a requisite to criminal conduct, Utah Code Ann. 76-2-101 (1953),
as amended.

It is a correct statement of the law that all

essential elements of the crime being charged must be alleged
in the complaint and information.

The crime of burglary,

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953), as amended, is defined:
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"A person is guilty of burglary
if he enters or remains unlawfully in
a building or any portion of a building
with intent to commit a felony or theft
or commit an assault of any person."

The requisite elements are (1) unlawfully entering or remaining;
(2) in a building; (3) with intent to (a) commit a felony, (b)
commit a theft, or (c) commit an assault.
The complaint reads as follows:
"Clark Hastings, Leo James Suit and
Daniel Wilbur on or about the 17th day of
January A.D. 1974, at Hurricane, Utah,
Washington County, State of Utah, did
commit a 3rd degree felony as follows,
to wit: Burglary, committed as follows:
that they did then and there enter or
remain unlawfully in the Graff Mercantile
building with intent to commit theft in
violation of 76-6-202 UCA 1953 as amended."
The information reads similarly:
"Burglary committed as follows:
That said Willard Clark Hastings and Leo
James Suit on or about the 17th day of
Jan,., 1974 at Hurricane, Wash. County, State
of Utah, did enter or remain unlawfully
in the Graff Furniture and Hardware Building
with intent to commit theft in violation of
Section 76-6-202 UCA 1953, as amended."
It is apparent that both the complaint and the
information specifically allege "intent to commit theft" as an
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element of the crime.
contend.

There is no fatal defect as appellants

There is no defect at all.

The jurisdiction of the

district court to hear the third degree felony charge was
therefore properly invoked according to the procedures provided
by law.
POINT II
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE THE
TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), as amended, reads:
"A conviction shall not be had on
the testimony of an accomplice, unless
he is corroborated by other evidence,
which in itself and without the aid of
the testimony of the accomplice tends
to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense; and the
corroboration shall not be sufficient,
if it merely shows the commission of the
offense or the circumstances thereof."
Appellants allege that the testimony of their
accomplice, Daniel Wilbur, who was granted immunity in exchange
for his testimony, was uncorroborated by other evidence and that
their conviction cannot therefore stand.

Were there in

actuality no other evidence, Utah law would dictate a reversal.
However, such is not the case.

Sufficient corroborating

evidence was presented to the court aside from the testimony

of appellants' partner in crime.

In State v. Erwin, 101 Utah

365# 120 P.2d 285 at 299 (1941), Mr. Justice Wade stated:
"This court has held that
corroboration need not go to all
the material facts testified to by
the accomplice; that the corrobortive
evidence need not be sufficient in
itself to support a conviction; it
may be slight and entitled to little
consideration . . . the corroborating
evidence must implicate the defendant
in the offense and be inconsistent
with his innocence, and must do more
than cast a grave suspicion on him,
and all this must be without the aid
of testimony of the accomplice."
See also State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 236 P.2d 1077 (1951) ;
State v. Stewart, 57 Utah 224, 193 Pac. 855 (1920);

People v.

Lee, 2 Utah 441 (1889); State v. Spencer, 15 Utah 149, 49 Pac.
302 (1897); and State v. Brunner, 106 Utah 49, 145 P.2d 302
(1944) .
The evidence must be viewed independently of Daniel
Wilbur's testimony.

It must connect appellants to the commission

of the offense, but need not be sufficient to support a conviction.

A look at the evidence offered at trial clearly shows

that Mr. Wilbur's testimony did not alone convict appellants.
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(1)

Several guns were confiscated, pursuant to a search

warrant, from the Las Vegas home of Roy Suit, brother of
James Leo Suit, appellant (T.226-228).

(2)

The make,

caliber and serial numbers of these firearms were identical
to those stolen from Graffs on January 17, 1974 (T.95-109,
226-228).

This evidence goes to corroborate Mr. Wilbur's

account and to connect defendants with the offense.

(3)

Testimony was given by a Mr. Foster to the effect that in
the early morning of January 17, 1974, between 12:00 o'clock
midnight and 2:00 o'clock a.m., Clark Hastings and Leo Suit
appeared at his home.
money (T.197).

(4)

Hastings asked for lodging and for
Suit gave Mr. Foster a Brown 243 rifle

which Hastings described as "hot" (T.198,202).
then left Foster's residence (T.202) .

(6)

(5)

Suit

Foster later

returned the rifle to Suit, and that same rifle was found by
the police wrapped in green plastic and buried in the desert
outside Hurricane (T.204).

(7)

Mrs. Isom, Leo Suit's

mother-in-law, testified that her son-in-law received a
telephone call on March 6, 1974, from his brother in Las Vegas
(T.240), the same day the search warrant was executed and the
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guns confiscated from the brother's home.

(8)

Suit borrowed

Mrs. Isom's car and he and Clark Hastings carried from the
house an object, described as a rifle, wrapped in green plastic.
They also had with them a shovel (T.242-243).

(9)

Clayton

Stratton testified that he saw one of the appellants parked
in a car on a back road outside of Hurricane on the 6th day of
March, 1974.
(10)

He later led the police to that spot (T.257-258).

The police testified they followed tracks from the road

to a cedar tree and dug up a green plastic bag containing a
Brown 243 (T.265-266).

There is ample evidence, provided in

the record, on which to draw a connection between the appellants
and the crime.

This evidence need not support a conviction,

nor go to support all the material facts testified to by the
accomplice.

It need only establish a connection between

appellants and the crime and be inconsistent with their
innocence to be considered corroborative.

The jury was

properly instructed on testimony of an accomplice and the need
for corroborating evidence in Instructions Nos. 14 and 18.

The

requirements of Utah Code Ann. • § 77-31-18 (1953), as amended,
were therefore met.

-8-

POINT III
NO REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY OR ADMITTING EVIDENCE.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence relating to "theft" and "stolen property"
and in instructing the jury regarding that evidence.

The

evidence admitted consisted of the rifles confiscated from
the Las Vegas home of appellant Suit's brother, and the Brown
243 unearthed by the Hurricane police.

These articles were

admitted in order to establish a connection between appellants
and the commission of the crime of burglary, not to establish
guilt of "theft" or "possession of stolen property" or any
other crime.

The jury was properly instructed on these matters

by the court in jury instruction No. 16.

The evidence was

offered to corroborate the testimony of Mr. Wilbur as required
by Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), as amended.

This evidence

was a product of a valid search and seizure, pursuant to a
warrant and was relevant and material.

It was not error to

admit it. .
Appellants also claim that the Court erred in giving
instruction No. 17, which reads:

"You are instructed that
possession of property recently
stolen when no satisfactory
explanation of such possession is
made, shall be deemed prima facie
evidence that the person in possession stole the property."
This instruction is taken from Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-402 (1953), as amended.

In State v. Kirkman, 20 Utah

44, 432 P.2d 638 (1967), speaking of an almost identical
statute repealed and reenacted in 1973, the Court said:
"This statute has nothing to do
with burglary and applies only to
charges of stealing. However, one
who has possession of recently stolen
property would be faced with the
situation of having adverse inferences
drawn against him, and such inferences
together with all the other evidence
might be enough to convince a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was guilty of larceny even
in the absence of the statute above
quoted.
" (3) The same adverse inference
will confront a defendant in a burglary
case where he has possession of recently
stolen property which could have been
obtained only by a burglarious entry
into a building. There would be a duty
upon the one in possession of such
property to explain his possession if he
is to remove that adverse inference
against him pointing toward his guilt;
and if he gives a false account of how
he acquired that possession, or having
a reasonable opportunity to show that
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his possession was honestly acquired
he refuses or fails to do so, such
conduct is a circumstance which may
be considered by the jury along with
all other evidence bearing upon the
case in determining guilt or innocence.
"This court has heretofore had
occasion to deal with this problem.
In the case of State v. Thomas, 121
Utah 639, 244 P.2d 653, it was said:
'We recognize the correctness
of the defendant's assertion that
mere possession of recently stolen
property, if not coupled with other
inculpatory or incriminating circumstances, would not justify submission
of the case to the jury and would
not be sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Kinsey, 77 Utah 348, 295
P. 247, and cases therein cited; State
v. Nichols, 106 Utah 104, 145 P.2d 802.
Conversely, however, possession of
articles recently stolen, when coupled
with circumstances inconsistent with
innocence, such as hiding or concealing
them, or of making a false or improbable
or unsatisfactory explanation of the
possession, may be sufficient to connect
the possessor with the offense of burglary
and justify his conviction of it.'"
Although the instruction given was not properly
applicable to the crime of burglary, not every error on the
part of the court is grounds for reversal.

According to Utah

Code Ann. § 77-53-2 (1953), as amended, an error is reversible
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only if the defendant is actually prejudiced by the error
in respect to a substantial right.

It is clear that the

Court in Kirkman viewed possession of stolen property,
taken from a burglarized building, to raise a strong
inference of guilt, if not adequately explained.

This

inference, coupled with all the other evidence offered
at trial, could certainly support a conviction, without
Instruction No. 16.
be reversed.

The conviction should not therefore

The effect of that instruction has not been

shown to have substantially prejudiced appellants.
Appellants admit in their complaint that no
specific exception was made to the challenged instruction
until motion for a new trial.

General exceptions are

insufficient to raise questions on appeal.
24 Utah 482, 68 Pac. 418 (1902).

State v. King,

Appellants must specifically

except to jury instructions, Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-2 (1953),
as amended, in order for the lower court to first rule.
As no such exceptions were taken they cannot now be raised.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully seeks affirmance of the
conviction in the lower court on the grounds that (1) the
complaint and information complied in every respect with
the requirements of the law and the jurisdiction of the
district court was properly invoked; (2) there was
sufficient evidence before the court to corroborate the
testimony of the accomplice; and (3) no prejudicial error
was committed by the trial court warranting reversal.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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